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What Is It like to Feel Another’s Pain?*
Fre´de´rique de Vignemont and Pierre Jacob†‡
We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among standard
pain, contagious pain, empathetic pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain ascrip-
tion. Vicarious experiences of both contagious and empathetic pain resemble to some
extent experiences of standard pain. But there are also crucial dissimilarities. As neu-
roscientific results show, standard pain involves a sensorimotor and an affective com-
ponent. According to our account, contagious pain consists in imagining the former,
whereas empathetic pain consists in imagining the latter. We further argue that aware-
ness of another’s standard pain is part of empathetic pain, but empathetic awareness
of another’s standard pain differs from believing that another is in standard pain.
1. Introduction. Can one experience or share another’s pain? Some recent
scientific evidence suggests that for a variety of emotional experiences
(e.g., disgust and fear) and bodily sensations (e.g., touch and pain), talk
of sharing is not just loose talk (Wicker et al. 2003; Keysers et al. 2004;
Singer et al. 2004; Blakemore et al. 2005). In this article, we focus on
pain at the expense of other experiences. The question we want to address
is, to what extent can you share my pain in my right foot as a result of
your becoming aware of my injury? Thus, our topic is empathy for pain,
or empathetic pain. Given the ubiquitous and often confusing use of the
*Received October 2010; revised October 2011.
†To contact the authors, please write to: Fre´de´rique de Vignemont, Institut Jean Nicod,
Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 29 rue d’Ulm 75005 Paris, France; e-mail:
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term ‘empathy’ and its cognates in recent experimental investigation of
human social cognition, we take it as an urgent task in the philosophy
of the cognitive sciences (cognitive neuroscience, in particular) to clarify
their content.1 As we will argue, empathetic pain is a vicarious experience
of pain. There are both similarities and dissimilarities between what we
call, respectively, my experience of standard pain in my right foot and
your vicarious experience of pain. Whereas my standard pain is caused
by injury to my foot, your vicarious pain is caused by my standard pain.
As we will further argue, there are two kinds of vicarious experiences of
pain: contagious pain and empathetic pain.
The following commonsense example will illustrate the threefold dis-
tinction among standard pain, contagious pain, and empathetic pain.
Imagine a screaming infant who feels standard pain after being injected
with a vaccine into his shoulder. Now consider the 6-year-old infant’s
sister watching the needle penetrate her little brother’s shoulder. She tenses
up and shrinks as if she were anticipating the pain caused by the needle
in her own shoulder. Her vicarious experience of pain is an experience of
contagious pain. Finally, consider the mother holding her son in her arms.
Unlike her daughter, she is not imagining the painful vaccine injected in
her own body. Her vicarious experience of pain is an experience of em-
pathetic pain: she is painfully experiencing her son’s standard pain. She
believes that her son is in pain.
This article falls into six sections. In section 2, we argue that experi-
encing vicarious pain is to imagine being in pain. What is shared between
two individuals, one of whom experiences vicarious pain as a result of
her awareness of the other’s injury, depends on the former’s ability to
imagine selective aspects of the latter’s painful experience. In section 3,
we examine neuroscientific findings showing that standard pain involves
the joint activity of two dissociable neurological components: a sensory-
discriminative and an affective component. The neuroscientific evidence
also shows that the brain regions underlying vicarious pain partially over-
lap with the brain regions underlying standard pain. In section 4, we try
to account for subtle conceptual distinctions among four related psycho-
logical phenomena: standard tasks of mind reading another’s affective
state, empathetic responses, contagious responses, and sympathetic re-
sponses to another’s affective state. Given that empathetic pain involves
both affective sharing and affective mind reading, in section 5, we ask
which, in the process generating empathetic pain, comes first: affective
sharing or mind reading?
1. The English word empathy was introduced in 1907 by the psychologist Titchener
as a translation of the German Einfu¨hlung. For a good historical account, see Stueber
(2008).
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2. Experiencing Vicarious Pain: E-imagining Being in Pain. What does it
take to undergo a vicarious experience of pain? Our tentative answer is,
to imagine being in pain. This makes our account distinct from either the
mirroring-based account (e.g., Rizzolatti and Craighero 2005; Freedberg
and Gallese 2007) or the direct perception view (e.g., Zahavi 2008). Now,
as many philosophers have emphasized (e.g., Currie and Ravenscroft
2002; Goldman 2006b), there are at least two broad kinds of imaginative
processes: one can imagine that p and one can imagine doing so and so.
Imagining that p is what Goldman (2006b) calls supposition-imagination
(or S-imagination): it enables us to engage in counterfactual reasoning.2
Imagining doing something is what Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) and
Goldman (2006a, 42), respectively, call the “recreative” imagination and
Enactment-imagination (or E-imagination): it enables one to “create or
try to create in one’s own mind a selected mental state, or at least a rough
facsimile of such a state.”
It is therefore approximately equivalent to a process of mental simu-
lation, whereby a psychological mechanism is being used off-line. Given
its basic information-processing function, a cognitive mechanism takes
canonical inputs and produces canonical outputs in response. For ex-
ample, when working online, vision takes retinal inputs and produces
visual percepts; the motor system transforms motor instructions into the
execution of motor acts; the decision system takes goals and beliefs as
input and produces decisions as a basis for action. However, as several
scientists and philosophers have argued on behalf of the off-line theory
of mental simulation, a cognitive mechanism can also be taken off-line.
For example, visual imagery has been construed as an instance of E-
imagining seeing something, whereby one’s visual system is run off-line:
it is provided with inputs from memory, not retinal inputs. In response,
it produces a visual image, instead of a visual percept. Motor imagery
has been hypothesized to be the output of a process whereby the motor
system is taken off-line, and one E-imagines producing a movement. Fi-
nally, one’s decision system has been hypothesized to be taken off-line
for the purpose of predicting another’s decision, instead of taking a de-
cision on the basis of which to act (Jeannerod 1994; Currie 1995; Currie
and Ravenscroft 1997).
Similarly, one can E-imagine being in standard pain, using one’s pain
system off-line. Interestingly, recent neuroscientific evidence shows that
the process of E-imagining being in pain involves similar activity in the
brain as the experience of standard pain (Jackson et al. 2006; Ogino et
al. 2007). On Currie and Ravenscroft’s (2002) generalized recreativist hy-
2. Goldman (2006b, 48) himself favors the reductionist view according to which sup-
posing that p is equivalent to E-imagining believing that p—a step we do not endorse.
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pothesis, accepted by Goldman (2006a, 2006b), any psychological state
(including beliefs and desires) has a pretence or imaginative counterpart,
so that one can speak of pretend beliefs (or belief-like imaginings) and
pretend desires (or desire-like imaginings). We believe that, applied to
beliefs and desires, the generalized recreativist hypothesis faces serious
challenges (for further discussion, see Nichols 2004; Carruthers 2006).
Nonetheless, we assume that a restricted version of the recreativist hy-
pothesis can help account for experiences of vicarious pain. The assump-
tion is that vicarious pain is the output of the process of E-imagining
another’s pain by running off-line one’s own pain system.
However, one may challenge this assumption on the grounds that imag-
ination is a voluntary process. For instance, one can engage in visual
imagery or in pain imagery at will. By contrast, it does not seem as if
one could experience vicarious pain at will. If so, then vicarious pain
should not be conceived as the output of E-imagination. But this con-
clusion assumes a binary contrast between voluntary and involuntary acts,
which is an unacceptable oversimplification. E-imagining another’s pain
by running off-line one’s own pain system is neither straightforwardly
voluntary (or intentional) nor straightforwardly involuntary (or nonin-
tentional). Instead, it is subintentional in O’Shaughnessy’s (1980) sense.
Examples of subintentional bodily actions are the movements of one’s
tongue in one’s mouth as one reads, the movements of one’s fingers as
one is attending to a lecture, or the tapping of one’s feet to the rhythm
as one is listening to a piece of music. Such acts are not instances of
reflexive responses to an incoming signal, like pupil dilation, which cannot
be prevented. On the contrary, one can stop tapping one’s feet to the
rhythm if requested to do so. Nor are subintentional acts intended in the
sense that the movements involved are caused by one’s intention to per-
form them. Upon noticing that one is performing some subintentional
act, one discovers that one is, as O’Shaughnessy puts it, “responsible”
for it (60). In other words, subintentional acts can be, as McGinn (2004,
14–15) puts it, subject to the will, “in that it makes sense to direct the will
at them.”3
Vicarious E-imagination is similarly subject to the will: although it can
rarely be voluntarily triggered (except maybe after training, as in Buddhist
monks), it can be inhibited and is subject to modulation by a variety of
3. It could still be objected that all the instances of subintentional acts provided by
O’Shaughnessy are instances of overt actions, involving the agent’s bodily movements.
But what is in question here is a covert process of E-imagination with no overt bodily
expression. In response, we propose to extend O’Shaughnessy’s notion of a subinten-
tional act to overt and covert actions. If this is so, then the agent’s movements can be
either executed or imagined.
TO FEEL ANOTHER’S PAIN 299
factors. It is known that the experience of standard pain itself can be
highly modulated (see, e.g., Hardcastle 1999). Not unexpectedly, the neu-
roscientific evidence reviewed in the next section will show that the vi-
carious experience of pain also is subject to modulation by attentional,
personal, and contextual factors. Furthermore, the susceptibility of vi-
carious experiences of pain to modulation is corroborated by common-
sense observation. Arguably, one may voluntarily stop paying attention
to a person in pain or stop empathizing with the pain of a fictitious
character, upon realizing that one is just watching a movie. It seems to
us that evidence showing modulation of vicarious pain by a variety of
factors, including some top-down factors, argues in favor of the concep-
tion of vicarious pain in terms of the subintentional E-imaginative process
of running one’s own pain system off-line.
We thus endorse a simulation-based approach to vicarious pain. To
accept a simulation-based approach is to accept what we call the “inter-
personal similarity condition” (i.e., psychological similarity between a
person’s standard pain and another’s vicarious pain). However, to what
extent are the experiences of standard pain and vicarious pain similar?
Given that one’s pain system involves two dissociable components, we
predict that there are two basic kinds of vicarious experiences: one of
which is the output of running off-line the sensory-discriminative com-
ponent of one’s pain system, and the other of which is the output of
running off-line the affective component of one’s pain system.
3. The Two Components of Standard Pain and Vicarious Pain. The in-
vestigation of standard pain raises a number of deep ontological, epis-
temological, and methodological issues, which have recently come center
stage (Aydede 2006). We will not address them here: especially, we leave
it open whether standard pain is representational and, if so, what the
nature and content of painful experiences are. Our purpose is the inves-
tigation of the nature of vicarious pain. As Goldman (1992, 31) wrote
almost 20 years ago, “at present I don’t think that we can properly specify
the respects of similarity between original and vicarious affective states.”
However, thanks to recent evidence from neuroscience, we may now be
in a position to assess the similarities and the dissimilarities between stan-
dard pain and vicarious pain.
According to the canonical definition provided by the International
Association for the Study of Pain (IASP 1986, 250), pain is “an unpleasant
sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue
damage, or described in terms of such damage.” Of particular importance
for this article is the widely recognized dual nature of painful subjective
experiences: standard pain has both a sensory component and an affective
component. For example, when one experiences a toothache, one’s painful
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experience is of a damaged tooth (the sensory component), and one ex-
periences a distinctive kind of unpleasantness (the affective component).
From a neurological standpoint, it has been shown that the so-called
pain matrix includes two functionally specialized networks. The sensory-
discriminative component involves the experience of the intensity of pain
and its bodily location. It recruits primary and secondary somatosensory
areas (SI and SII) as well as the posterior insula. SI has a somatotopic
organization; that is, distinct body parts are represented in distinct brain
areas. Thus, different regions of SI are activated according to whether
one experiences standard pain in one’s hand, in one’s foot, or in one’s
mouth. In addition, the sensory-discriminative component has a motor
counterpart: its activity underlies specific automatic motor responses
whose function is to avoid (or decrease) the pain. For instance, the muscles
adjacent to the location of the painful stimulus freeze, so to speak. Fur-
thermore, one can find a higher motor reactivity in the hand susceptible
to removing the painful stimulus. The affective component involves the
experience of the unpleasantness of the painful experience. It recruits the
anterior insula, the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC), the thalamus, and
the brain stem. It lacks somatotopic organization. The two components
of pain can be dissociated: for instance, the administration of drugs and
the use of surgery can remove the unpleasantness (or at least the aversion
to the unpleasantness) of pain. In such cases, patients no longer seem to
mind the pain. The most extreme instance of such dissociations is the
syndrome of pain asymbolia. As Aydede (2009, sec. 4.2) puts it, “these
people still identify their experience as pain, but show no bodily, emo-
tional, and behavioral signs typically associated with the unpleasant aspect
of pains. They are feeling a pain that doesn’t hurt!”
When one experiences standard pain as a result of some bodily injury,
then both the sensory-discriminative and the affective components of the
pain matrix are active. But if one experiences vicarious pain, then what
happens? Are both components active? As we will see, the neuroscientific
evidence shows that an experience of vicarious pain can be primarily
generated by the selective activation of only one of the two components
of standard pain: the sensory-discriminative or the affective component.
3.1. Vicarious Sensorimotor Pain. Similar automatic motor responses
have been observed when the back of one’s right hand is being deeply
penetrated by a needle and when one observes the back of another’s right
hand being deeply penetrated by a needle. In a nutshell, when one sees
another’s hand being hurt, one automatically freezes one’s own hand, as
if one’s own hand were injured. Using single-pulse transcranial magnetic
stimulation, Avenanti et al. (2005, 2009) observed muscle-specific inhi-
bition in the participants’ right hand, as well as a generalized increase of
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corticospinal excitability in their left hand. By contrast, they found no
such inhibition when participants were shown either a cotton swab gently
moving over the same area of the hand or a needle penetrating a tomato.
The intensity of motor inhibition was correlated with the perceived in-
tensity of pain but not with empathy personality traits. Furthermore, it
did not make any difference to motor inhibition whether participants were
asked to merely watch the needle penetrate or to focus on how unpleasant
the experience was for the owner of the hand (Avenanti et al. 2006). In
addition to the motor component of pain, another study found activity
in SI during observation of a needle penetrating the hand (Bufalari et al.
2007). Again, this activity was correlated with the perceived pain intensity
but not with its perceived unpleasantness. These experimental results
strongly suggest that in experiencing vicarious sensorimotor pain, one
responds to the perception of another’s bodily part subjected to painful
stimulation by imagining pain, that is, expecting specific sensorimotor
consequences of pain, at the same location on one’s own body. To con-
clude, both the somatosensory side and the motor side of pain can be
recruited in vicarious pain, independently of its affective side.
Let us consider again our earlier example. The 6-year-old sister is
anticipating the sensorimotor consequences of the painful injection in her
own shoulder. If we were to record her muscle activity, we would probably
find muscle-specific motor inhibition, which characterizes the sensori-
motor component of pain. Arguably, however, her anticipation of the
sensorimotor consequences of the painful injection leads her also to an-
ticipate the affective consequences of the injection for herself. Hence,
although she may eventually undergo a vicarious experience of both com-
ponents of pain, we propose that her full vicarious experience is primarily
grounded in the sensory component. She anticipates the affective con-
sequences of pain, only insofar as she anticipates its sensory consequences.
As we will see now, there is another type of response to another indi-
vidual’s pain that is primarily grounded in the affective component of
pain.
3.2. Vicarious Affective Pain. Other experimental evidence, based on
functional brain imaging (fMRI), shows that the affective component of
pain can be selectively activated when people are made aware of others’
painful experiences. For instance, when participants saw an arrow indi-
cating that their partner was being inflicted a painful stimulus or when
they saw a facial expression of pain, Singer et al. (2004) and Botvinick
et al. (2005) found activation only in the affective component of pain (i.e.,
ACC and bilateral anterior insula), which was correlated with empathy
personality traits. No sensorimotor activity was found. Interestingly,
fMRI studies that used videos of detailed painful situations (finger or
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foot crushed by a door) found the same results (Jackson, Meltzoff, and
Decety 2005). Participants’ responses to the pain of others did not depend
on whether they knew the bodily location of the pain. Whether they saw
a finger or a foot in pain made no difference: no somatotopic effect was
found. Taken together, these results suggest that one species of vicarious
pain can be deprived of spatial bodily ascription.
Further experiments showed that the selective activity of the affective
component of pain was modulated by a wide range of personal and con-
textual factors (for a review, see Singer and Lamm 2009). To give a few
examples, reduced activity in the affective component was found (i) in
male participants when the person in pain was previously unfair to them
(Singer et al. 2006), (ii) in medical practitioners (Cheng et al. 2007), and
(iii) when participants believed that the other’s pain resulted from a useful
treatment or that the injured bodily part was anesthetized (Lamm, Batson,
and Decety 2007). In summary, much evidence shows that affective vi-
carious pain is subject to modulation by contextual factors, some of which
must be processed by high-level cognitive systems, in accordance with our
view that vicarious pain is subintentional.
To conclude, in most brain-imaging studies, one kind of vicarious pain
activates the affective component of pain but not the sensory-discrimi-
native component. As a result, one can share another’s pain without
necessarily knowing the bodily location of the other’s standard pain. This
is why one can vicariously experience pain upon either perceiving an-
other’s facial expression (which does not reveal the bodily location of the
other’s pain) or imagining another’s nonlocated painful experience. But
if what we call affective vicarious pain lacks spatial and sensorimotor
content, then the question arises, is it a genuine experience of pain or is
it an experience of psychological distress?
3.3. Affective Vicarious Pain and Social Pain. The question is made
more acute by the fact that a recent neuroimaging study shows that
psychological distress due to social exclusion also activates the affective
component of standard pain (Eisenberg, Lieberman, and Williams 2003).
Participants played a virtual ball-tossing game from which they were
ultimately excluded. During exclusion, the authors found increased ac-
tivity of the ACC, which was positively correlated with self-reported dis-
tress. The authors refer to this phenomenon as “social pain.” Interestingly,
a common painkiller was shown to be efficacious in preventing social pain
as well as standard pain (Dewall et al. 2010). However, whereas the pain-
killer relieved standard pain in 4 hours and has no cumulative effect,
social pain was only relieved after a period of several days. It follows
that, although some of the brain structures underlying the experience of
standard pain also underlie the experience of social pain, the latter should
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not be assimilated to the former. Nor should psychological distress ex-
emplified by social pain be identified with vicarious affective pain.
Social pain involves no bodily injury of any kind, either to one’s own
body or to another’s body. Vicarious affective pain only is generated by
another’s standard pain. Whereas social pain is not a bodily sensation,
we claim that vicarious affective pain is, to some extent, a bodily feeling
in Armstrong’s (1962) sense. In addition to brain activity of the affective
component of pain, some pain observation studies found activity related
to the sensory component of pain when participants were asked to pay
more attention to the intensity of pain or to its bodily location (e.g., SII;
see Lamm, Nusbaum et al. 2007; Cheng et al. 2008; Lamm and Decety
2008). True, none of these studies found a somatotopic organization of
the brain responses (and no activity in SI). In other words, the vicarious
pain was not encoded in a particular part of the body. Yet, some bodily
aspect was encoded. Armstrong’s (1962) distinction between bodily sen-
sation and bodily feeling may be of help here. Bodily sensations (e.g.,
touch and pain) are experienced as being located in a particular part of
the body, whereas bodily feelings (e.g., thirst and hunger) need not be.
Within this conceptual framework, vicarious affective pain might be
thought of as a vicarious version of a global (nonlocalized) bodily feeling
of the type “It hurts.”4
Thus, as we read it, the neuroscientific evidence shows three things.
First, it shows that the brain activity underlying vicarious pain partially
overlaps with the brain activity underlying standard pain. To some extent,
this supports the claim that one can share another’s experience of standard
pain. But second, since overlap is not identity, it also shows that vicarious
pain should not be confused with standard pain. Finally, it shows that
there are two kinds of vicarious experiences of pain. On the one hand,
vicarious sensory pain is localized in a particular bodily part and is pri-
marily grounded in the sensory component, which in turn can activate
the affective component. On the other hand, vicarious affective pain is
not localized in a particular bodily part and is primarily grounded in the
affective component, although (unlike social pain) it can be associated to
some global somatosensory component when explicitly required. In other
words, the two kinds of vicarious experience of pain correspond, respec-
tively, to sensory E-imagination, primarily driven by the off-line use of
the sensory component of one’s own pain system, and to affective E-
4. On the assumption that patients with pain asymbolia experience a version of pain
(sensory component with no affective component of pain), vicarious affective pain
could be conceptualized as the mirror image of pain asymbolia, i.e., an experience of
a version of a global bodily feeling of pain from which the sensory discriminative
component is (partly or entirely) absent.
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imagination, primarily driven by the off-line use of the affective com-
ponent of one’s own pain system.
Why this neural dissociation? How come the sensori-discriminative
and the affective component of the pain system can be selectively activated
in response to the same type of stimuli? Why not both at the same time?
Is it just a mere artifact due to experimental differences? Or does it reveal
a more fundamental distinction between two distinct species of vicarious
pain? Although differences in techniques and attention to bodily details
may play a role, they cannot exhaustively account for the differences
between the two series of evidence. In particular, they cannot account for
a fundamental difference in the direction of intentionality of each species
of vicarious pain. As we will argue, vicarious sensory pain is self-centered
and constitutes what we call an experience of contagious pain, whereas
vicarious affective pain is other-directed and constitutes what we call an
experience of empathetic pain. Arguably, being self-centered and being
other-directed are two inconsistent properties of an experience: one cannot
be in a psychological state that is both self-centered and other-directed
at the same time. As our introductory example shows, while the vicarious
sensory pain of the infant’s little sister is centered on her own body, the
vicarious affective pain of the infant’s mother is directed toward the infant.
Only if the sensory component of pain is bracketed can one undergo an
experience of vicarious affective pain that is other-directed.
4. A Definition of Empathy. The goal of the current section is to further
elaborate the dissociation between E-imagining the sensorimotor aspect
of pain and E-imagining the affective aspect of pain by mapping it onto
the distinction between contagious pain and empathetic pain. In many
theories, it is quite unclear how to draw the boundaries between sympathy,
empathy, and contagion or even whether they should be distinguished at
all. But in fact, there are important conceptual and psychologically rel-
evant distinctions among an empathetic response to another’s pain, a
contagious response, a sympathetic response, and what can be called
standard mind reading. As we now argue, many of the relevant contrasts
can be best revealed by considering a range of examples involving not
only pain but also various emotional experiences.
First of all, we assume that not unless two individuals are experiencing
some affective state or other could one be said to empathize with the
other.5 This condition, which we call the affectivity condition, enables us
5. Some may want to extend the notion of empathy beyond affective sharing and apply
it to other types of mental states. For example, Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004)
include in their Empathy quotient the understanding of any mental states such as
beliefs and desires. By doing so, they erase the distinction between perspective taking
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to draw the boundary between standard mind reading and empathy. When
I perform a standard task of mind reading, I come to believe that you
are in some psychological state or other (e.g., a feeling), which I ascribe
to you. Thus, I may know what you feel without feeling what you feel.
For example, suppose that only you suffer from vertigo attacks when you
walk on the edge of a cliff. Now, on the basis of my conceptual mastery
of vertigo and your behavioral cues, I may come to believe that you are
experiencing vertigo without my sharing your experience of vertigo. In
such a case, my ascription of vertigo to you counts as an instance of
standard mind reading, not empathy.
Second, we assume that not unless the empathizer’s affective state
stands in some relevant similarity relation to her target’s affective state
can the former be said to empathize with the latter. This condition, which
we call the interpersonal similarity condition, enables us to distinguish
sympathy from empathetic and contagious responses, both of which are
vicarious experiences whose contents and characters crucially depend on
the contents and characters of the basic emotions that cause the vicarious
experiences. By contrast, sympathy is a kind of sui generis social emotion:
no matter what affective state another is experiencing (e.g., pain, jealousy,
anger), to sympathize with another is to feel sorry for her. In our initial
example, the nurse is likely to sympathize with (hence, feel sorry for) the
infant in pain. Thus, there is no relevant similarity between the nurse’s
sympathetic response and the child’s standard pain. Had she experienced
vicarious pain, her medical efficiency might have suffered from it.
Third, we assume that the empathizer’s affective state must be caused
by the target’s affective state. If two individuals experience the same af-
fective state as a result of a common cause, then one’s affective experience
is not the cause of the other’s. If so, then one cannot be said to empathize
with the other.
So far, the three mentioned conditions are satisfied by both empathetic
and contagious responses to another’s affective state. Now, in order to
distinguish empathetic from contagious responses, a further condition
must be added, which only empathy can meet and which we call the
ascription condition, namely, that the empathizer must be aware of the
target’s affective state, if not of the fact that her own affective state is
caused by another’s. Arguably, in crowd panic, one may automatically
respond to the others’ behavioral display of fear by catching their fear
without representing what they are afraid of, let alone the very fact that
and empathy. Another example comes from the literature on mirror neurons, which
are sometimes interpreted as instances of empathetic understanding of other people’s
actions (Gallese 2001; Rizzolatti and Craighero 2005). However, it is highly question-
able whether the same mechanisms are at stake in affective sharing and motor sharing
(Jacob 2011).
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they are afraid. If so, then one fails to meet the ascription condition, and
thus one cannot be said to empathize with their fear.
We lay out in a schematic form the following set of four conditions
that must be met for X to empathize with Y (for a similar account, see
Vignemont and Singer 2006):
i) Affectivity condition: X is in some affective state or other s*;
ii) Interpersonal similarity condition: X’s affective state s* stands in
some similarity relation to Y’s affective state s;
iii) Causal path condition: X’s being in state s* is caused by Y’s being
in state s;
iv) Ascription condition: X is aware of Y’s being in s.6
As they stand, these four conditions need tighter articulation, as the fol-
lowing example will illustrate. Suppose Y feels anxious, and his anxiety
is contagious, and X catches Y’s anxiety. So far, conditions i–iii are sat-
isfied. Conceivably, X feels anxious, but she does not know why. Now
suppose that X becomes aware of Y’s anxiety after being told about it
by some third party. If so, then ascription condition iv is satisfied in
addition to conditions i–iii. Still, it does not seem as if X empathized with
Y’s anxiety because she may not even be aware that her vicarious anxiety
is caused by Y’s anxiety. In this example, two independent psychological
processes are involved: conditions i–iii are met as a result of emotional
contagion, but ascription condition iv is met as a result of verbal com-
munication between X and a third party. In this sense, X does not em-
pathize with Y. Even if her psychoanalyst explains to X the source of her
anxiety, still X will not empathize with Y. This example highlights the
fact that for X to empathize with Y, it is necessary that X’s understanding
of Y’s affective state depends in some way or other on the fact that X’s
own vicarious experience is relevantly similar to Y’s. In other words, the
fact that X shares Y’s affective state must to some extent contribute to
X’s understanding of Y’s experience. As a result, we offer a revised version
iv* of condition iv:
iv*) X’s being in s* makes X aware that her being in s* is caused by
Y’s being in s.
6. Acceptance of conditions i–iv on empathy is far from uncontroversial. For example,
on Wispe´’s (1986, 320) account, empathy is a “most often effortful” cognitive process
“whereby one person tries to understand accurately the subjectivity of another person,
without prejudice.” On this account, empathetic understanding needs consist in neither
some affective response nor one that bears some similarity relation to the target’s own
state. On Hoffman’s (2000, 4) account, empathy is “an affective response more appro-
priate to another’s situation than one’s own.” Since it makes no room for similarity
condition ii, this account better fits our own usage of the word ‘sympathy’ than ‘empathy’.
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TABLE 1. RESPONSE CHARACTERISTICS
Standard
Mind Reading Contagion Sympathy Empathy
i) Affective   
ii) Similarity  
iii) Causality   
iv) Ascription   
iv*) Revised ascription 
v) Care  
Furthermore, in view of the evidence in favor of the modulation of
empathetic responses by contextual and personal factors, a further con-
dition should be built into our attempted definition of empathy:
v) Caring condition: X must care about Y’s affective life.
Generally speaking, an egotist stance seems hardly compatible with either
sympathy or empathy. The caring condition reflects the fact that empathy
is not the default response to one’s awareness of another’s affective state
in general. In particular, empathetic pain is not the default response to
one’s awareness of another’s standard pain. If one is indifferent or has a
negative attitude toward the person in pain (e.g., if she has been previously
unfair; see Singer et al. 2006), then one may not engage in a process of
affective E-imagination.
As table 1 shows, our approach offers a systematic account of the
distinctions among empathetic responses, contagious responses, sympa-
thetic responses to another’s emotion, and nonempathetic emotion as-
cription achieved by standard mind reading. Only empathetic pain meets
all five conditions. This article, however, is not devoted to empathy in
general: we do not assume that humans are so built that they must respond
to another’s emotional display in a single canonical way. For example,
there is no reason to suppose that one responds to another’s display of
anger in the very same way in which one responds to another’s display
of fear or disgust. Our goal here is merely to spell out the nature of
vicarious experiences of pain within this conceptual framework. In par-
ticular, we can now interpret the dissociation between sensory and affective
vicarious pain. Since both meet the first three conditions, it follows that
vicarious pain does not qualify as a sympathetic response. What matters
to the distinction between contagious and empathetic responses to an-
other’s pain is the ascription condition iv*. We assume that a vicarious
experience of pain cannot be both other-directed and self-centered. As we
will now argue, only if it meets conditions iv* and v can a vicarious
experience qualify as empathetic because it is other-directed and not self-
centered.
Let us first consider sensory vicarious pain, which results from E-imag-
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ining pain at a definite location on one’s own body. When seeing another’s
hand subjected to painful stimulation, one simply runs off-line the sen-
sorimotor component of one’s pain system and thereby maps the other’s
bodily part subjected to painful stimulation onto one’s own bodily coun-
terpart and anticipates the sensorimotor consequences of pain at this
bodily location. As a result, one’s experience of vicarious pain is both
anticipatory and entirely self-centered: it is an instance of contagious not
empathetic pain. In all the studies that highlight sensorimotor responses
to the observation of another’s pain, there is no evidence that the par-
ticipants were aware that their sensory vicarious pain was caused by an-
other’s standard pain. Furthermore, if their response were constitutive of
an empathetic response, then one would expect that adopting the other’s
perspective (“putting oneself into her shoes,” so to speak) should amplify
the motor inhibition. However, Avenanti et al. (2006) found no such
modulation, nor did they find any correlation between the strength of the
response and the participants’ score in empathy questionnaires. Avenanti
et al. (2009, 1073) concluded: “corticospinal inhibition may reflect a ‘sen-
sorimotor contagion’, i.e. an automatic embodiment of sensory qualities
of pain onto the observers’ motor system.” Following Avenanti and col-
leagues, we propose to interpret vicarious sensory pain in terms of self-
centered contagious pain.
Unlike sensory E-imagination, affective E-imagination is other-directed,
as confirmed by several empirical findings (e.g., Singer et al. 2004, 2006).
Arguably, the most conclusive example is offered by the recent fMRI
study by Lamm, Meltzoff, and Decety (2010). Participants were informed
that they were observing neurological patients who experienced pain when
they were lightly touched but not when they were submitted to surgical
operations. Lamm et al. (2010) reported that participants displayed ac-
tivity in the affective component of pain when they saw the patient’s hand
being touched with a cotton swab but not when they saw it submitted to
a needle injection. Participants must have run off-line the affective com-
ponent of their pain system in order to E-imagine what the neurological
patients felt. Following these findings, we propose to interpret affective
vicarious pain in terms of other-directed empathetic pain.
Let us consider once again our stock example. When the infant’s sister
sees the needle penetrate her brother’s shoulder at time t, she E-imagines
the sensorimotor consequences of the injection at at the same lo-t 1
cation on her body at which she sees the painful stimulus being applied
on her brother’s. Her sensorimotor E-imagination concerns her future
self. The content of her sensory E-imagination-based thought would be
true if and only if she were in pain at as a result of receiving ant 1
injection at this bodily location. It would be false if she had not received
an injection or if she received an injection but failed to feel pain (because,
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e.g., she was anesthetized) or it was at a different bodily location. By
contrast, when the mother sees the needle penetrate her son’s skin, she
painfully E-imagines her son’s affective disarray from the first-person
perspective, namely, from the perspective of her son being in pain. Her
affective E-imagination concerns another individual, namely, her son. The
content of her E-imagination-based thought would be true if and only if
her son was in pain at time t. But it does not make any difference to the
content of her E-imagination-based thought whether her son’s standard
pain was in the right or in the left shoulder. She might be said to mis-
empathize only if her son did not experience standard pain at all.7 Her
vicarious experience of empathetic pain is her way of painfully repre-
senting her son’s standard pain.
To conclude, contagious pain and empathetic pain are vicarious ex-
periences of pain that can be distinguished along two dimensions. On the
one hand, the former is primarily driven by a process of sensory E-imag-
ination. The latter is primarily driven by a process of affective E-imagi-
nation. On the other hand, whereas the former is self-centered, the latter
is other-directed. One may wonder whether these two dimensions mutually
interact. We do not have a definite answer. However, it seems to us that
if you are asked to imagine being in pain, it is likely that you retrieve
memories of past experiences of standard pain. As such, those past ex-
periences are remembered as being located in a particular part of the body
(e.g., a toothache). By contrast, if you are asked to imagine someone else
being in pain, you can more easily E-imagine a global unpleasant bodily
feeling without necessarily localizing it in any particular bodily part. We
thus suggest that it is the direction of intentionality (i.e., self-centered vs.
other-directed) that determines whether it is the sensory or the affective
component of pain that is run off-line in vicarious pain. Furthermore, we
assume that one cannot undergo both contagious pain and empathetic
pain at the same time because an experience cannot be both self-centered
and other-directed at the same time. Roughly speaking, there is compe-
tition between self-centered and other-directed experiences, and only one
can prevail at a time. Imagine the following revised version of our initial
example. Both the little boy and his mother receive an injection. Arguably,
the focus of the mother’s attention can either be her own pain or her
son’s pain. She might alternate from one to the other, but it seems unlikely
that she can attend simultaneously to the two painful experiences. Rather,
7. If X wrongly ascribes pain to Y as a result of vicariously imagining Y in pain (by
needlessly running off the affective component of her pain system), while Y fails to
experience standard pain, then X can be said to undergo an illusory experience of
empathetic pain (indistinguishable from X’s point of view from a genuine experience
of empathetic pain).
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it seems that her own standard pain might distract her from her vicarious
affective pain. The same is true of vicarious sensory pain. If one is ex-
pecting the sensorimotor consequences of pain on one’s body, then one
cannot focus on another’s pain. Therefore, one could not experience vi-
carious affective pain unless one was able to bracket vicarious sensory
pain.
5. Affective Sharing and Affective Mind Reading. The motivational role
of empathetic pain for moral and prosocial behavior (i.e., responding to
another’s distress to alleviate it) has often been stressed. Our definition
of empathetic pain, however, tackles a more fundamental issue, namely,
the ability to ascribe pain to other people. Prosocial behavior psycholog-
ically depends on affective mind reading. In order to react appropriately
to another’s pain, one needs first to understand the fact (or to believe)
that she is in pain. Hence, prosocial behavior requires third-person mind
reading. It is not clear, however, that empathy is either necessary or suf-
ficient for prosocial behavior. It is one thing to explain the cognitive and
psychological competence underlying an individual’s ability to perform
tasks of affective mind reading, or in Batson’s (2009) terms, “how one
can know what another person is thinking and feeling.” It is another thing
to explain an individual’s tendencies toward prosocial behavior or, in
Batson’s terms, “what leads one person to respond with sensitivity and
care to the suffering of another” (16). Here, our focus is on the former
more fundamental aspect. Empathy is a special kind of third-person mind
reading, that is, a special affective way of representing and understanding
another’s affective psychological state (hereafter, affective mind reading,
by contrast to standard mind reading).
As we argued, what individuates empathetic pain is that it meets the
ascription condition. Henceforth, for vicarious affective pain to be an
empathetic state, it must contribute to affective mind reading. In order
for the revised ascription condition iv* to be met by a genuine empathetic
response, affective sharing and affective mind reading must be intimately
connected. The question then arises, how do affective sharing and affective
mind reading interact with each other? How could the empathizer’s belief
about the target’s affective state give rise to a relevantly similar affective
state in the empathizer’s mind? Conversely, how could the fact that the
empathizer is experiencing an affective state similar to the target’s own
affective state give rise to the empathizer’s belief about the target’s af-
fective state? We seem to be facing a dilemma, neither horn of which
seems very appealing: the ‘sharing-first’ option and the ‘mind reading–
first’ option.
The sharing-first option fits the simulation theory of mind reading (e.g.,
Goldman 2006b). On this approach, the empathizer comes to share the
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target’s affective state as a result of pretending to be in the other’s emo-
tional situation and running her own affective appraisal system as normal.
The output of the simulation process, namely, the affective state, is then
attributed to the other. But if this is so, then two related questions arise:
Why should affective sharing give rise to the belief that the target is in
pain? There is a clear difference between experiencing pain and believing
that another is experiencing pain. Neither is a necessary condition for the
other. In particular, experiencing pain is not necessary for believing that
another is in pain. If so, then how could sharing another’s pain lead an
empathizer to believing that another is in pain and to ascribing pain to
him? But now the second question arises: If sharing another’s affective
state always gave rise to empathy, then wouldn’t both the existence of
contagious responses to another’s affective state and the difference be-
tween contagious and empathetic responses to another’s affective state
become utterly mysterious?
The mind reading–first option has been explicitly advocated by Sober
and Wilson (1998, 234), who define empathy as follows: “S empathizes
with O’s experience of emotion E if and only if O feels E, S believes that
O feels E, and this causes S to feel E for O.” This definition assumes that
not unless an empathizer first believes that her target is in pain could she
share the target’s pain and experience empathetic pain. This option gives
rise to three problems. First, it is puzzling how belief about another’s pain
could give rise to some painful experience in the ascriber herself. Second,
experiencing pain is costly. If understanding another’s painful experience
can be achieved by executing a standard task of mind reading without
experiencing pain, why should a mind reader assume the additional burden
of experiencing pain? What is the function of the experience of pain in a
task of pain ascription? Finally, on the face of it, this view seems hard
to reconcile with some neuropsychological evidence. Some patients who
can no longer experience disgust or fear turn out to be unable to recognize
facial expressions of disgust or fear, although they still understand the
emotions at the conceptual level (Adolphs et al. 1994; Calder et al. 2000).
Furthermore, it has been reported that seeing someone being hurt does
not activate the pain matrix in patients with alexithymia (i.e., those who
do not report any emotion; Bird et al. 2010). Being deprived of the capacity
for affective experience may thus disrupt mind reading. It seems that
affective sharing plays some role in affective mind reading and that being
able to undergo emotional experiences is a prerequisite for empathy for
pain.8
8. Interestingly, activation of the affective component of pain has been reported in
patients with congenital insensitivity to pain when they observed body parts in painful
situations or facial expressions of pain (Dantziger, Faillenot, and Peyron 2009). On
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In a nutshell, neither the sharing-first option nor the mind reading–first
option seems quite acceptable. On the former option, the distinction be-
tween empathy and contagion collapses. On the latter option, the evidence
in favor of affective sharing for affective mind reading in neuropsycho-
logical patients is unexplainable. Instead, our distinction between two
kinds of vicarious pain, contagious and empathetic pain, based on two
kinds of E-imagination, may contribute to resolving the dilemma. Thanks
to this distinction, we avoid the risk of collapse of empathetic pain into
contagious pain. Furthermore, the differences between these two types of
E-imagination may help us understand why affective E-imagination alone
can meet the revised ascription condition iv*.
In standard pain, the experience of affective disarray is correlated with
the localization of pain in some definite bodily part. In vicarious conta-
gious pain (which is self-centered), the experience of psychological disarray
arises from E-imagining (expecting) the sensorimotor consequences of
pain at some definite location in one’s own body in the future. Now,
vicarious empathetic pain (which is other-directed) results from running
off-line the affective component of one’s own pain system. In vicarious
empathetic pain, one experiences psychological disarray, as a result of E-
imagining the unpleasantness of pain while experiencing no standard pain
caused by injury to one’s own body. So one experiences psychological
disarray as a result of E-imagining the unpleasantness of another’s pain.
So in contrast to experiences of either standard pain or contagious pain,
there is an asymmetry between the strong activity of the affective com-
ponent (which generates a strong psychological disarray) and the weak
activity of the sensory component of the pain system (which generates a
weak global bodily feeling). In either standard pain or contagious pain,
the unpleasantness of actual or hypothetical pain is correlated with the
localization of pain in some definite bodily part. But in empathetic pain,
the psychological disarray is only correlated with a global bodily feeling
with no definite bodily location.
The lack of bodily location makes empathetic pain a highly specific
type of pain. Interestingly, the two components of pain can be dissociated
but only in one direction (sensorimotor without affective component).
One never experiences the unpleasantness of standard pain without its
the basis of their results, the authors argue that personal experience of pain is not
necessary to understand another’s pain. These patients indeed showed a complete lack
of discomfort or withdrawal reaction to prolonged pinpricks, strong pressure, soft tissue
pinching, and noxious thermal stimuli. However, they could experience pain on some
occasions, such as spontaneous electrical discharges or migraine attacks. Conceivably,
when they observed a finger being cut, the patients could run off-line the affective
component of their own pain system, which is normally activated when they suffer
from migraines, for instance.
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sensorimotor correlates. One can indeed mislocalize standard pain (e.g.,
referred pain), but one can never experience standard pain without as-
cribing it to a rough bodily location. The experience of unpleasantness
of standard pain thus generates sensorimotor expectations. However, in
the case of empathetic pain, these expectations are not fulfilled. Because
of the mismatch between the expectations and the lack of actual senso-
rimotor activity, one becomes aware that one experiences empathetic pain
rather than standard pain; that is, one becomes aware that one’s own
psychological disarray is caused by another’s standard pain. This, we
surmise, is why, unlike experiences of contagious pain (and of course
standard pain), experiences of empathetic pain alone meet ascription con-
dition iv*. However, if the mismatch was not registered at one level or
another, then arguably one could fail to realize that the other’s pain is
the cause of one’s own experience of vicarious pain. If so, then one would
experience an instance of illusory standard pain and hopelessly start to
look for a nonexistent location of pain in one’s own body.
6. Concluding Remarks. What it is like for you to feel my pain in my
right foot differs from what it is like for me to feel my pain in my right
foot. On the basis of the neuroscientific distinction between the affective
and the spatial/sensorimotor components of standard pain, we have ar-
gued that the experience of empathetic pain may share some of the qual-
ities of the affective component of a target’s standard pain. Awareness of
my pain may cause you to E-imagine (i.e., expect) the sensorimotor con-
sequences of pain in your own right foot in the future. If so, then my
pain would cause you to undergo a contagious experience of pain. If you
were to empathize with my pain, then your experience of empathetic pain
would lack the spatial/sensorimotor component of my standard pain in
my right foot. If so, then the difference would not be merely quantitative:
the former is not merely less intense or vivid than the latter. Empathetic
pain and standard pain are two distinct types of pain experiences. Because
they are dissimilar, there is no risk for the empathizer to confuse her
experience of empathetic pain with an experience of standard pain.
At the core of our account are the joint assumptions that empathetic
pain is a vicarious experience of pain (caused by another’s standard pain)
and that vicarious experiences of pain are generated by a process of mental
imagery, that is, a special kind of nonpropositional imagination involving
the off-line use of one’s own pain system. There are two main current
alternatives to an imagination-based account of empathetic pain: the di-
rect-perception and the mirroring models (for detailed discussion, see Ja-
cob 2011; Jacob and Vignemont, forthcoming). The direct-perception
model erroneously construes empathetic pain as a perceptual experience
of another’s pain. Although a vicarious experience of pain can take as
314 FRE´DE´RIQUE DE VIGNEMONT AND PIERRE JACOB
input the perception of cues of another’s pain, it is not a perceptual
experience. Perceiving cues of another’s pain is neither necessary nor suf-
ficient for empathetic pain: empathetic pain can be triggered by testimony,
and it is not the default response to the perception of cues of another’s
pain. The mirroring model fails for a distinct reason. We took it as a
condition of adequacy that a satisfactory account must be able to distin-
guish empathetic pain from four related, although distinct, phenomena:
standard pain, contagious pain, sympathy for pain, and standard pain
ascription. The mirroring account fails to offer a principled distinction
between empathetic and contagious pain. Thus, we surmise that the imag-
ination-based account currently offers the best prospect for meeting the
above condition of adequacy on empathetic pain.
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